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This paper draws on Peter Evans’ approach to the developmental state and applies it 
to examine the scope for state-society synergy at the local level in Morocco. In doing 
so, it highlights the usefulness of Evans’ concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ for 
theorizing about the developmental state. The paper studies the internal and 
interactive capacities of local government and local civil society organizations in 
Morocco. It argues that there are certain pre-conditions with regard to state capacity 
which enable complementarity and embeddedness to emerge. The main finding of the 
paper though (drawing on my extensive fieldwork in two rural municipalities in 
Morocco) is the high degree of political instrumentalisation that characterizes the 
relationships between local government and local civil society. The paper therefore 
aims to enrich the debate on the developmental state by emphasizing the importance 
of finding the right balance between autonomy and embeddedness if networks that 








The premise that the state should be seen as an organization maintaining a special, 
autonomous status from society has remained a powerful part of social and political 
theories right up to the present. It was expressed in a.o. statism, structuralism, rational 
choice theories, and neo-realism. According to Migdal (2001: 7-17), the influential 
volume entitled Bringing the State Back In (edited by Evans et al. 1985) was part of 
the new statist literature that emerged as a response to social systems models and 
Marxist theories, which it criticized for their inability to distinguish analytically 
between the state and other sectors of society. State-oriented scholars drew heavily on 
Max Weber, and especially on that part of his writings that stressed the 
conceptualization of the state as an autonomous organization with extraordinary 
means to dominate. However, those acted upon, the objects of control, played little 
role in the theories and were conceived of as passive recipients of others’ rules. 
Migdal (2001: 15) argues that ‘the assumption that only the state does, or should, 
create rules and that only it does, or should, maintain the violent means to bend 
people to obey those rules minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, 
and resistance that occur in every human society among multiple systems of rules.’  
 
Evans (1995), writing from a comparative institutionalist perspective, develops the 
notion of the developmental state to give a more nuanced view of state autonomy.
1
 He 
suggests that although the characteristic features of the Weberian bureaucracy (highly 
selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards, creating commitment 
and a sense of corporate coherence) mean that these apparatuses have a certain kind of 
“autonomy”, they are not insulated from society as Weber suggested they should be. 
In Evan’s words (1995: 12), 
 
‘To the contrary, they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the 
state to society and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation 
and re-negotiation of goals and policies. Either side of the combination by itself 
would not work. A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of 
intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private implementation. Dense 
connecting networks without a robust internal structure would leave the state 
incapable of resolving “collective action” problems, of transcending the individual 
interests of its private counterparts. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are 
joined together can a state be called developmental.’ 
 
This apparently contradictory combination of corporate coherence and connectedness, 
which Evans calls “embedded autonomy”, provides the underlying structural basis for 
successful state involvement in industrial transformation.  
 
Evans’ subsequent work (1996) extends this framework to state involvement with 
society more broadly, and distinguishes between “complementarity” and 
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 See Fritz and Rochal Menocal (2007) for a comparison of the concept of the developmental state and 





 as elements of state-society synergy. The term “synergies” refers to 
‘mutually reinforcing relations between governments and groups of engaged citizens’ 
(Evans 1996: 1119). The core of my D.Phil. thesis - on which this paper is based - 
studies the internal and interactive capacities of both local government and village 
associations (or Community-based Organisations, CBOs) along administrative, fiscal, 
and political dimensions as pre-conditions for state-society synergies to emerge. The 
principal research question thus relates to whether the main local actors, i.e. local 
government and local “civil society” actors, have the capacity and incentives to 
engage in developmentally valuable relations based on complementarity and 
embeddedness (as used by Evans 1995 and 1996). These relationships can take the 
form of formal and informal co-production arrangements (i.e. partnerships for service 
delivery), or more political co-governance mechanisms.  
 
The paper argues that there is currently limited scope for state-society synergies in the 
case of rural Morocco. Instead, aided by the overriding concern for regime 
maintenance on the part of the makhzen
3
, the boundaries between political and civil 
societies, and between public and private spheres, have become very much blurred. 
This situation further encourages elite capture and the expansion of clientelist 
practices, all of which stands in sharp contrast to the characteristics of the 
developmental state and state-society synergy. 
 
The empirical findings presented here are based on field research in two rural 
communes (municipalities) in Al Haouz province South of Marrakech that took place 
during 13 months over the period September 2004 to March 2006. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out the conceptual 
framework. The third section provides a brief background on state-society relations at 
the national level in Morocco. The two subsequent sections present a summary of the 
empirical findings on the capacities of local governments and local associations to 
engage in partnerships, respectively. The sixth section discusses the actual record of 




2. The conceptual framework 
 
Relatively few studies have considered the pre-conditions (in terms of local 
governance arrangements, and actors’ autonomy and capacities) for local partnerships 
or synergies to actually materialize. As argued above, a return to theories on the 
developmental state and the concept of “embedded autonomy” is very helpful in order 
to start filling this gap. Evans (1996: 1119ff.) distinguishes between two elements that 
constitute synergy: complementarity and embeddedness.
4
 Complementarity suggests a 
clear division of labour, based on the contrasting properties (comparative advantages) 
                                                 
2
 See Woolcock (1998: 162ff.) for a discussion of the origin of the concept of “embedded autonomy” 
(esp. Polanyi and Granovetter). 
3
 This Arabic term nowadays refers to the power structures surrounding the monarchy. 
4
 This discussion is linked to the literature on partnership (see Brinkerhoff 2002 for a review). Here, the 
concept of mutuality seems to lie somewhere in between complementarity and embeddedness 
(Brinkerhoff 2002: 22-23). The partnership literature also uses terminology that comes close to the 
concept of co-production, such as contracting (ibid. 2002: 25). 
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of public and private institutions. Putting the two kinds of inputs together results in 
greater output than either public or private sectors could deliver on their own. For 
example, the state delivers rule-governed environments (“the rule of law”), which 
strengthen and increase the efficiency of local organizations and institutions (Evans 
1996: 1120 citing Nugent 1993; see also Tendler 1997). A more tangible example is 
state provision of big infrastructure and citizen’s contribution of local knowledge and 
experience that would be too costly for outsiders to acquire. These examples still fit 
nicely within existing paradigms in public administration and do not force any 
rethinking of the public-private divide. However, complementarity can also promote 
social capital formation in civil society. In the irrigation sector for example, efficient 
(public) provision of the tangible facilities may have the intangible consequence of 
making it more worthwhile for farmers to organize themselves. In such cases, 
complementarity also supports day-to-day interaction between public officials and 
communities.  Indeed, further evidence (e.g. Tendler 1997; Das Gupta et al 2004) 
suggests that the permeability of public-private boundaries must be acknowledged as 
an inescapable part of many developmentally successful programs (including the East 
Asian economic miracle).  
 
Evans (1996) calls such ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public 
private divide “embeddedness”. He argues that synergy is based on both 
complementarity and on embeddedness, which are mutually supportive. These ideas 
can easily be applied to the co-production model as proposed by Ostrom (1996) and 
others. “Co-production” refers to the process through which inputs used to produce a 
good or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organization. 
It implies that with encouragement from public officials, citizens can play an active 
role in producing public goods and services (Ostrom 1996: 1073-1074; see also 
McLean et al 2005: 2, Footnote 1). In Evans’ view, complementarity creates a basis 
for productive interaction, but without embeddedness the potential for mutual gain is 
hard to realize. In other words, complementarites create the potential for synergy but 
do not provide an institutional basis for realizing it. Evans cites examples where 
embeddedness in the form of direct involvement of public officials was a key 
component in getting citizen efforts organized and sustaining citizen involvement, for 
example in monitoring and maintenance of sanitation and irrigation infrastructure. 
 
Evans’ analytical distinction reminds us to look for both elements of complementarity 
and embeddedness when examining synergy. The key question here is whether 
networks that cross the public-private divide can be repositories of developmentally 
valuable social ties and networks based on trust rather than instruments of corruption 
or rent-seeking. In other words, when analyzing relationships between local 
government and CBOs, the focus should be on the potential for complementarity and 
embeddedness that has positive, rather than negative, development outcomes.  
 
There are various possible types of state-society synergies that lie on a continuum of 
increasingly blurred state-society boundaries, starting with complementarity and 
ending in embeddedness. At the practical level, it could be argued that this continuum 
is framed by co-production models and co-governance mechanisms on either end. Co-
production should be an entry-point for citizens to influence the overall practices of 
local governments and other service delivery actors, through a general opening up of 
decision making processes. Far too often however, accountability remains restricted to 
the specific subset of activities being jointly produced, which is treated as distinct 
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from the overall budget (McLean et al 2005: 18; see also Krishna 2004; Uphoff and 
Krishna 2004; World Bank 2004). Hence, co-production arrangements tend to 
promote depoliticized forms of participation.  
 
In contrast, the more advanced types of state-society relations take the form of co-
governance (also called “participatory local governance”), e.g. the participatory 
budgeting experience in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see Gaventa 2004, and the contributions 
in Cornwall and Coelho [eds.] 2007).
 5
 Such mechanisms explicitly violate the public-
private, or state-society boundary (Ackerman 2004: 450). These approaches are part 
of a broader notion of democracy than that implied by traditional electoral and 
deliberative mechanisms.
6
 They promote capacity building of local civil society and 
processes that increase consultation of citizens (including marginalized groups) by 
local government officials. They thus link civil society to local government decision-
making (including policy setting and resource allocation) through processes that 
increase information-flow (transparency), and ultimately aim to strengthen 
accountability and local government responsiveness (Helling et al 2005: 34, 68). Such 
co-governance mechanisms are thus the most advanced type of local government-
CBO interactions. 
 
In order to assess the scope for state-society synergies at the local level, this study 
analyzes the internal as well as interactive capacities of both local governments and 
local CBOs along the fiscal, administrative, and political dimensions. Following 
Morgan (2006: 6-7) capacity is an emergent property. It comes out of the dynamics 
involving a complex combination of attitudes, resources, strategies and skills, both 
tangible and intangible. There is a strong relationship between capacity and 
performance. Capacity is essentially a potential state, whereas performance can be 
seen as the result of the application or use of capacity. Lastly, capacity is about the 
creation of public value, i.e. the ability of a group or system to make a positive (rather 
than negative) contribution to public life. As for interactive capacity, it is defined here 




I must acknowledge though that the issue of capacity for and through local 
partnerships is a type of ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem: is a minimum level of capacity 
needed to engage in partnership, or does it only follow as a result of having engaged 
in partnerships? While it is easy to agree with Fiszbein (2000: 171-172) that 
partnerships often do contribute to ‘individual strengthening’ of the partners, this 
paper argues that certain minimum capacities are needed to engage in partnerships in 
the first place. It also argues that closer attention needs to be paid to the political 
identities, affiliations, and conflicts of and among local actors, as they can have 






                                                 
5
 Another term for similar examples of “deliberative decision-making” is “empowered participatory 
governance” (see Fung and Wright 2003; cited in Gaventa 2006). 
6
 See Tadesse et al (2006: 7) for a useful discussion of how participatory governance can address the 
limitations of representative democracy. 
7
 This use is similar to that of Morgan’s “capability to relate” (2006: 13). 
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3. State-society synergies in Morocco 
 
Before examining the scope for the state-society synergies at the local level, it is 
necessary to analyze the national policy and institutional environment governing 
state-society relations. There is no space here to give a thorough historical 
examination of the legal and policy frameworks governing state-civil society relations 
(including municipal charters, laws governing associations, the role of political 
parties, rural development strategies, and recent changes in the framework for 
partnerships between government and civil society). Suffice it to say that while these 
laws and policies have gradually been relaxed and allow for more interaction between 
the population, civil society, and government administrations, they do not yet permit 
the emergence of synergies in Evans sense.  
 
The main underlying reason for this is the role and policies pursued by the monarchy 
and the makhzen. Rather than representing a transformative political agenda, 
decentralization in Morocco was driven by the monarchy’s strategy to shore up its 
own legitimacy, and not primarily by a desire to increase citizens’ political 
participation or government accountability. Similarly, with regard to its position 
towards civil society and political parties, the monarchy pursued a policy of “divide 
and rule” and co-optation so as to prevent the emergence of any potentially 
destabilizing force. With regard to both local government and local civil society, the 
agents of the Ministry of the Interior retain important powers of tutelle (i.e. tutelage, 
guardianship or supervision) and control. Finally, in the area of agriculture, the partial 
land reform (and the continued promise of completing it) was used by the monarchy 
to establish its clientelist system and contain the threat of rural uprisings. 
 
At present, the monarchy seems to be oscillating between old forms of 
authoritarianism and experiments at political opening. For example, shortly after his 
accession to the throne in 1999, King Mohamed VI introduced the new concept of 
authority (le nouveau concept de l’autorité). It has been argued that this new concept 
of authority amounts to a new culture of public service based on the respect for 
decentralized institutions and local liberties (Harsi and El Yaagoubi 2006: 191-192). 
It certainly implies increased administrative and financial autonomy for local 
authorities.  
 
Most importantly, a new Municipal Charter was issued in October 2002 and entered 
into force the following year, replacing the Charter of 1976. It enlarges the 
responsibilities of the councils, establishes a legal status for the councillors, and gives 
a special status to the big urban areas. It also for the first time contains provisions 
related to the commune’s role in reducing poverty and exclusion. In fact, it could be 
argued that this charter considers the communes as a framework for holistic 
development (El Yaagoubi 2004: 60). Similarly, the current Charter for the first time 
includes the possibility to create partnerships with non-governmental organizations. 
The commune council can enter into partnership agreements with local associations, 
although the Ministry of the Interior’s exercises a tutelle on such partnership 
agreements. 
 
However, even if the royal discourse now sometimes seems to be ahead of the reality 
on the ground, deep-seated top-down modes of operation and attitudes towards the 
population and civil society within the government bureaucracy still present a 
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considerable obstacle to any radical transformation. While networks that blur the 
boundaries between state and society do exist in Morocco, they are mainly of a 
clientelist nature, rather than promoting complementarity and embeddedness that 
could constitute synergy. 
 
These findings at the systemic level are born out at the local level, to which the 
remainder of this paper now turns. 
 
 
4. Local government administrative, fiscal and political autonomy 
and capacity 
 
In order to assess the two communes’ administrative autonomy and capacity, the field 
research collected data on eight main variables: the communes’ human resource base, 
the extent of independence from the Department of Local Authorities (the tutelle 
authority at the province level), the degree of the councillors’ and staff awareness 
about the provisions in the new Municipal Charter, the extent of the Ministry of the 
Interior local representative’s (caïd) influence over council affairs, the application of 
the new concept of authority, the nature of local development priorities, the quality of 
the local planning process, and the character of relations with other government 
administrations.  
 
The empirical findings point to serious constraints in local government administrative 
autonomy and capacity. In terms of human resources, between half and two-thirds of 
the councillors are illiterate, and many are often absent from the communes. They 
represent a mostly traditional local elite based on private wealth, although an 
alternative and more outwardly open elite is emerging through better education, 
temporary urban or international migration, and the increasing need for development 
brokers. As for the civil servants, only a limited number is working directly on socio-
economic development, and they do not have much incentive nor opportunity to 
develop their skills. Their motivation is generally low due to tensions with the 
councillors.    
 
The tutelle exercised by the Ministry of the Interior is mostly of a strictly legal nature, 
but the councillors themselves seem to be uncomfortable to use the full room for 
manoeuvre to take decisions. Given the limited staff competences at the local level, a 
stronger tutelle in terms of ensuring technical quality standards might in fact be 
needed. I further found that the implementation of the new Municipal Charter is 
severely constrained by the councillors’ limited knowledge of its provisions, due 
mainly to insufficient training and information campaigns on the part of the Ministry 
of the Interior. This risks opening the door to continued conflicts of interests and the 
pursuit of personal gain, compounded by the increased concentration of power in the 
office of the council president. On the other hand, the limited knowledge of the 
Charter also means that the councillors will most probably never even try to push for 
the transfer of additional responsibilities and funding from central government that 
the Charter allows for. Indeed, even if the councillors were well informed, it seems 
that as long as the current system allows them to pursue their own vested interests 
without any significant interference from the population at large, there are no 




As for the influence of the local representative of the Ministry of the Interior over 
council affairs, it appears to be substantial. This is mainly due to his ability to 
mobilize the local population (through his network of subordinates in every village), 
although the discourses around human rights and the new concept of authority are 
gradually eroding his traditional influence that was based on fear and repressive 
measures. It seems that the caïd’s persuasive influence on the councillors depends to a 
great extent on his personality and intellectual capacity vis-à-vis the council president. 
In addition, any informal, mutual accommodations and bargains that might have been 
concluded between the caïd and the councillors (especially those in the political 
majority) determine the nature of their relationships. Such accommodations are 
difficult to discern for an outsider. It is also difficult to generalize these findings, 
given that they are bound to differ from commune to commune. 
 
Finally, the case study communes’ administrative and interactive capacity is further 
constrained by the councillors’ narrowly conceived development priorities. They are 
very much focused on basic infrastructure provision in their constituent villages, 
rather than developing a commune-wide vision for economic growth, e.g. by 
attracting private investment, which would in turn increase local tax revenues and 
ability to provide public services. National infrastructure programs and 
“participatory” rural development programs do not encourage the development of 
their own priorities, mainly due to the lack of consultation (which is however legally 
obligatory). The councillors also did not use the opportunity for bottom-up planning 
in the context of the recent national 2000-2004 Five-year Plan. This Plan received 
scant attention in the communes, mainly because it would have interfered with tacit 
and politicized agreements between the councillors aimed at maintaining the council 
majority and their personal clientelist networks. A more longer-term planning 
approach is be emerging, at least among certain councillors, though the promotion of 
multiple local development plans by various other government and donor agencies 
might not facilitate this. 
 
These findings stand in contrast to “best practice” identified in the literature on public 
sector capacity. Based on six country case studies, Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995: 
444, 455-460) stress the importance of organizational culture over structures for 
remuneration and control to explain effective public sector performance. Such 
organizational culture emphasizes flexibility, problem-solving, participation, 
teamwork, shared professional norms and a strong sense of mission. Successful 
human resources management also includes their effective utilization, i.e. ensuring 
that staff feel they are using their talents to accomplish meaningful tasks, with 
adequate equipments, and with the prospect of having their good performance 
recognized in some way. These features thus go beyond those identified in the ideal 
Weberian bureaucracy model, which stresses meritocratic recruitment, good salaries, 
sharp sanctions against violations of organizational norms, and solid rewards for 
career-long performance, although these are crucial preconditions for achieving the 
‘embedded autonomy’ that characterizes the developmental states according to Evans 
(Evans 1996: 1126, see also Evans 1995, Rauch and Evans 2000).  
 
Based on the Moroccan case studies, I would argue that tensions between commune 
staff and the councillors (in particular the council president), the role played by the 
tutelle authorities and the caïd in determining local decision-making processes, the 
dependence on other ministerial departments for project planning and funding, and the 
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ad hoc and untransparent nature of the local planning process, have, at least until 
recently, stifled the emergence of such an organizational culture in the rural 
communes. Together with the findings on local government financial and political 
capacities, this constitutes a serious obstacle for local synergies with CBOs based on 
complementarity and embeddedness. 
 
The degree of local government fiscal autonomy is measured by the share of transfers 
from central government compared to local tax revenues in total local government 
revenue. This is a relevant indicator since a local revenue base contributes to a greater 
sense of ownership among people; their contribution through taxes and fees to the 
costs of local infrastructure and services strengthens both citizen demand and the 
accountability of public officials. The greater degree of local discretion associated 
with own-source revenues enhances decision-makers’ capacity for responsiveness 
(Helling et al 2005: 24). By contrast, the more dependent a local government is on 
transfers from the centre, the more likely it is to focus its accountability upwards 
(McLean et al 2005: 24). Analysing the share of recurrent to capital expenditures 
helps us to assess local government’s capacity to interact with other local actors. If 
recurrent expenditures consume all funds, there is limited scope for partnership with 
local civil society organizations (McLean et al 2005: 4, 24).  
 
The detailed analysis of the communes’ revenues and expenditures leads me to 
conclude that their fiscal autonomy remains limited, due mainly to the high 
dependency on VAT transfers from central government (up to 86 percent of total 
revenues on average in recent years). Increasing local tax and public service revenues 
depends on finding solutions to several legal and political enforcement problems. The 
rise in recurrent expenditures as a share of total expenditures (especially the wage 
bill) is a further constraint on local government to engage in partnerships with local 
civil society. Capital expenditures are dominated by basic infrastructure (roads, water, 
and electricity) whose developmental impact is limited as long as certain 
complementary activities are lacking (such as affordable public transport, and help 
with access to financial services, production inputs, and output markets). 
Considerable end-of-year surpluses do exist which could be used for such 
investments. However, they remain unspent due to expenditure delays, poor or 
politically motivated planning, and the use of these surpluses to cover the national 
budget deficit. The main constraint on using local resources productively and in 
innovative ways – for example in co-production arrangements with civil society 
organizations – seems to be the lack of visionary leadership, and the predominant 
concern on the part of the councillors to satisfy clientelist demands. 
 
The findings on the political dimension of decentralization help to explain this 
situation. The population has few incentives to participate in commune affairs, and 
only very limited means of holding their councillors accountable. Indeed, even the 
councillors in the political opposition in the council cannot do so as they have very 
limited access to information. The role of the political parties is also very weak. This 
is illustrated by the fact that several councillors were unable to recall the name of their 
political party, and several long-time councillors had changed parties with each new 
election. The main value of political parties in the eyes of the councillors seems to be 
their ability to distribute material benefits to them, rather than providing a framework 
for formulating measurable public policy programs and plans. These findings are 
surprising given that one of the two communes is among the most politicized 
Copyright PSA 2008
 10 
communes in Al Haouz province. It has a history of trade unionism, as a left-leaning 
working class formed based on mining and transport of manganese (though this 
stopped in 1969 with the decline of this industry). I would thus concur with Ferrié 
(1999: 83) in arguing that public municipal space does in fact not exist in Morocco, or 
at least is not fully formed yet, given that politics - if defined as the expression of 
conflict in impersonal, antagonistic terms - is not actually taking place.  
 
The field research also examined the two “participatory” rural development projects 
being implemented in the case study communes from the perspective of their potential 
contribution to strengthening political capabilities. However, although both the World 
Bank and IFAD projects present multiple opportunities to hone negotiation and 
planning skills – at least in theory -, their impact in this area is likely to be minimal. 
This is because the projects are prone to elite capture, and the overall structural power 
imbalance is in favour of the government administration. For example, the Village 
Development Plans that were agreed upon in annual work contracts between the 
Provincial Delegation of the Agriculture Ministry (DPA) and the village associations 
under the IFAD project are drawn up by the project staff at the DPA, and the 
representatives of the associations only come to sign them. Moreover, the contracts 
place a heavy burden on the associations. In addition to committing considerable 
financial resources and free manual labour, they stipulate that the associations are 
solely responsible for the operation and maintenance of the equipments, and the 
resulting operating costs (such as drinking water). They do not include any 
mechanism for the population to hold the government administration to account or to 
force it to fulfil its obligations under the contract. 
 
The superficial way in which “participation” is solicited in these projects, and the 
erosion of trust resulting from government not keeping its end of the bargain, actually 
puts state-society relations at a considerable risk in the longer term.  
 
Returning to the main theme of local government capacity to engage in local 
partnerships, the findings point to two main implications. First, the low share of local 
taxes in total local government revenues, and the current legal provisions mean that 
there is little incentive to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens with the aim 
of a responsive provision of services and greater accountability. Second, the 
organizational culture and visionary leadership is missing that could change the 
prevailing mindset and push for a local governance model based on complementarity 
and embeddedness with other local actors such as CBOs.  
 
The next section now assesses the capacity of local village associations in the two 
case study communes, and examines whether they have the potential to engage in 
developmentally valuable interactions with local governments. 
 
 
5. Local village associations’ readiness for partnerships 
 
The internal and interactive capacities of the 50 local village associations in the study 
sample were examined along administrative, financial, and political dimensions. 
These associations work in basic infrastructure and services (mainly drinking water, 
irrigation networks, environmental conservation), the social services (health and 
schooling, adult literacy, and cultural activities), and in a range of income-generating 
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projects (such as female cooperatives for embroidery and weaving, planting of fruit 
trees, bee-keeping, and tourism – most of which however suffer from instances of 
fraud, deception, and mistrust among members that lead to a halt in activities). The 
overwhelming priority given to basic infrastructure and service provision indicates 
that local governments are not able to fulfil their mandates for basic service provision 
under the Municipal Charter. There is thus considerable scope for synergies with local 
associations in the form of co-production and other public-community partnerships. 
However, the empirical findings indicate that the associations’ capacities are limited 
to engage in such partnerships. 
 
With regard to their administrative capacity, the associations’ record of implementing 
projects shows that a considerable proportion of associations are not active, and only 
exist on paper. It seems that this finding can be generalized for the whole province, if 
not most rural areas in Morocco.
8
 According to the former president of the Provincial 
Espace Associatif (a structure that aims to federate all the associations in the province 
– see below), it seems likely that only two or three associations in each of the 39 
communes in Al Haouz province are active in a continuous fashion, and therefore 
sustainable in the long-term (out of an official 1,400 associations in Al Haouz 
province, which counts less than 500,000 inhabitants). In particular, those associations 
that were “imposed” by outside projects are generally seen as inactive and not 
sustainable.  
 
This state of affairs is partly due to the weak human resource profile of most of the 
associations (58 percent of the association committee members interviewed did not 
receive any formal education). This also explains their limited ability to make links 
with intermediary NGOs at the provincial level as well as to negotiate effectively with 
government administrations in the context of rural development programs. These 
programs also do not place very much emphasis on training the associations, even 
though the latter are in many cases expected to manage and maintain vital basic 
infrastructure such as drinking water. Similarly, most associations have limited 
financial resources in the form of incomes from membership fees, although some are 
receiving revenues from drinking water provision (61 percent of 46 associations in the 
sample dispose of no funds or less than 100 Euros). An underlying reason here is that 
the concept of “membership” in an association is not well-anchored in local practice – 
almost 40 percent of the associations in the sample do not have any ordinary 
members, and women are absent almost completely both as committee and ordinary 
members. A strategic approach to fund-raising would also require a certain level of 
education and training.  
 
The most important factor in explaining the low level of activity is the fact that many 
leaders of local associations are in fact using them as a base to build popular support 
for getting (re-)elected as local councillor. Indeed, as Bourjeois and El Kam (2000: 
13) put it, ‘creating an association is a means to buy (political) “virginity” for oneself, 
and to conquer the political field.’ This practice has contributed to discrediting the 
                                                 
8
 This finding corresponds to the field observations of several other researchers who note that there are 
many associations on paper but very few that are active (other than participating in cultural activities 
such as festivals or national holidays). See Damamme (2005: 163 footnote); Abbadi (2003: 53); Chadli 




concept of “associations” in the eyes of the population, but several associations in the 
fieldwork area are now raising awareness to rehabilitate it. 
 
I also found serious shortcomings with regard to the internal governance mechanisms 
in many associations, such as the holding of regular annual meetings and leadership 
renewal, and keeping records. The monopolization of information by the president 
further constrains a wider participation in associative activities. In terms of the 
possibilities for co-governance with the communes, this raises the question of how the 
associations would be motivated to ask for more accountability from the commune if 
they themselves are not accountable to their members and donors. Given that many 
associations have evolved from the traditional village councils, the jema’a, it will take 
time to formalize management procedures and making them transparent to the 
communities at large. This should however take place in a way that preserves the 
positive aspects of the organizational fluidity that characterizes the jema’a, and most 
importantly, does not undermine traditional forms of intra-village solidarity (as is now 
happening in several villages). 
 
In terms of the implications for the study of “civil society”, the evidence presented 
here shows that it is not possible to speak of mass-based “social movements” in rural 
Morocco, although the Berber (Amazigh) associations may constitute the basis for 
such movements in the future (see Kratochwil 2002). Rather, most associations 
studied here are inward-looking and very much concerned with developing their own 
village, rather than forming alliances with each other or other NGOs. This trend is 
reinforced by “participatory” rural development projects that focus on developing 
separate Village Development Plans. The underlying reason though is the history of 
social organization and decentralization in Morocco, and in particular the swift and 
harsh repression of any local protest by the Ministry of the Interior and its local 
representatives, at least until recently.  
 
The decentralization process and the establishment of local councils have also meant 
that a new type of “political society” emerged in the form of councillors and political 
party members.
9
 I suggest that this “political society” dominates and in many cases 
mixes with “civil society”. This has important implications for the possibilities for 




6. Relations between local governments and village associations: 
limited embeddedness and political instrumentalization 
 
The preceding sections discussed the weaknesses in the internal and interactive 
capacities of local governments and associations to engage in co-production. It is 
therefore not surprising that the actual record of local partnerships in the case study 
communes is very limited. Most association members stated that they had no 
cooperation with the commune even though several of them had made requests for 
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 “Political society” is understood here as ‘that loose community of recognized political parties and 
their operatives, local political brokers and councillors, and perhaps even lower-level public servants 




help. In some cases, the commune contributed with materials for small-scale basic 
infrastructure projects, for example pipes for drinking water networks or the cement 
for the drinking water tank. In road construction, the commune provided the heavy 
trucks, or the money for petrol. It was sometimes difficult to know whether these 
projects were really projects that were conceived and implemented by the village 
association. It seems more likely that in many cases they took the form of informal 
agreements between the jema’a of the village and the commune, with the jema’a 
using twiza (a mostly Berber tradition of mutual help and solidarity, especially for 
farming-related tasks) to provide the necessary manual labour for free. The 
association would then only provide minimal input such as meals for the workers. 
These limited types of partnerships amount thus at best to what Evans calls 
complementarity, based on a clear division of labour between the commune and the 
village communities. 
 
I found only very few cases that could be said to constitute examples of partial 
embeddedness in the form of direct involvement of public officials to get citizen 
efforts organized and sustain citizen involvement (Evans 1996: 1123). In one case, the 
commune technician helped an association with the technical plans for building the 
association’s venue. Two other association members said the commune technicians 
had helped them with a technical study, but in their personal capacities. One 
commune staff claimed to have giving trainings to associations on the rules governing 
the creation of associations and constitution of the committee, but in a strictly 
personal and volunteer capacity. These examples point to sporadic instances of 
embeddedness, rather than any serious long-term engagement. 
 
This situation is partly due to the lack of local government subsidies to CBOs for 
service provision (impeded by legal and administrative problems), which hinders the 
development of their capacity to implement projects and mobilize collective action. A 
related constraint is the difficulty for the communes to establish and apply fair and 
transparent partnership (and eligibility) criteria. 
 
The more substantial and formal partnership agreements that have been concluded in 
Al Haouz province (concerning drinking water provision, the management of 
boarding facilities for pupils, and the upgrading of school buildings) were all 
“imposed” in the context of donor-funded projects or at the request of the provincial 
authorities, and did not evolve out of any local initiative. 
 
The reasons for the limited evidence of local partnerships are mostly technical in 
nature and could arguably easily be resolved, e.g. by devolving more funds earmarked 
for partnerships to the local governments (accompanied by clear rules on how they are 
to be disbursed, and regular audits), and informing the associations on funding criteria 
and procedures by issuing calls for project proposals.   
 
Given that financial, administrative and technical obstacles to partnerships should be 
relatively easy to overcome, is there a more structural underlying reason for this 
limited evidence of positive local government- CBO interactions? The answer lays in 
the politicized nature of local government – CBO relations, which blur the public-




As noted earlier, several associations were created for purely political purposes, rather 
than developmental ones. This explains the low levels of CBO activity (almost half of 
all CBOs in the sample are inactive), and some of the existing mistrust between the 
jema’a, the population and the CBO members. The empirical data shows that the 
boundary between membership in the commune council and CBOs is very much 
blurred. On average, only one fourth of the 46 associations for which data is available 
do not have any connections with party members, councillors or civil servants. In 
other words, the vast majority of associations are run by politicians and civil servants. 
This high level of CBO political affiliation was confirmed in the interviews with the 
councillors.  
 
Interestingly, only very few councillors openly acknowledged that wearing the two 
“hats” simultaneously (association member and councillor) creates a conflict of 
interest, which can only be resolved by putting one of them down. As one councillor 
explained: ‘I was VP in an association but given that there are two lines of work: 
politics and associative work, I committed to take just the political line so as not to 
confound it with the associative work; it’s like I tried to draw up a line of neutrality. 
[…] That’s what pushed me to tell the citizens that are affiliated with the association 
that I’m in the commune and I’ll stay there and I won’t confound the two lines. [So 
last year you decided to step down because you saw that there are problems if you 
confuse the two?] The only problem is that you cannot keep your neutrality; the 
principle of an association is not to do politics; and I would certainly find myself 
doing politics inside the association, if you understand what I mean.’ 
 
Similarly, a councillor and president of an inactive association argued that ‘in my 
opinion if you find the president of the commune also as president of the association 
it’s just to make [the population] vote in the next election. I think that if someone is in 
the association he should not be allowed to be councillor. Then you will know if he 
really wants to work [for the public interest] or just to defend his personal interests.’ 
 
The association members are aware of this high degree of politicization. One of them 
argued that the number of associations increased due to the state’s failure to develop 
the area, and that the state directed the population towards the associations to take 
charge of development in its place. In his words, ‘when the authorities felt that the 
people lost trust in them, they tried to get the associations to work. [… But then] the 
political parties and authorities felt they could not control what is happening on the 
ground, so they interfered and supervised the associations. […] If an association 
wants to work well and independently without being of one political party or another 
it won’t get any financing.’ He concluded that ‘there is no civil society.’  
 
To sum up, there are very few (formal) partnerships between communes and 
associations, and the financial amounts involved are negligible. I have argued that the 
main obstacle is the political instrumentalization of the associations by the local 
councillors. It seems that some groundwork needs to be done first. I would agree with 
this councillor, who suggested that ‘what is needed is that the associations understand 
their role; why do they exist? Is it really to participate in local development or is it for 
other reasons? If it’s for other reasons, why then have partnerships? So first we need a 
sort of self-critique; also on the part of the commune; the commune needs to 
understand that to let the associations participate can only be beneficial. […] There 
are associations and they need to be given responsibilities. They are there and have a 
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legal status. We talk about participation and integrated, sustainable development; we 
need to give them responsibilities, give them a minimum of tasks and take the 
necessary time for that. So the two parties are responsible for seeing the point in and 
need for cooperation.’ It is clear that against this backdrop, the scope for co-




My findings confirm those of other studies. Ben Ali (2005: 4-5) suggests that local 
development associations are generally seen by the elected councillors as instruments 
for political competition. This means they try to co-opt them (by presiding over them 
themselves or reducing them to the appendix of a party), or marginalize them. A 
roundtable discussion among civil society actors (Espace Associatif 2003: 57) 
established that most often, local authorities and political parties give funds to 






I return now to the concepts of complementarity and embeddedness that constitute 
state-society synergy in Evans’ framework. Such synergy always involves the 
blurring of public-private boundaries, but the key question is whether networks that 
cross this divide can be developmentally valuable repositories of trust rather than 
instruments of corruption or rent-seeking. Here, the idea of “embedded autonomy” is 
crucial. Evans (1995) introduces it in his explanation for the differential performance 
of India, Korea and Brazil in the high technology sector. This is an autonomy 
embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society and provide 
institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and 
policies (Evans 1995: 59). This means that the kind of coherent, cohesive bureaucracy 
that is postulated in the Weberian hypothesis must have a certain degree of autonomy 
vis-à-vis society. With regard to networks that cross the “public-private” divide, 
Evans’ concept draws attention to the fine line between those that are 
developmentally valuable repositories of trust, and those that are transformed into 
instruments of corruption or rent-seeking. I would argue that this aspect of 
“autonomy” is missing in the Moroccan context, given the difficulty to distinguish 
between local actors’ “public” and “private” identities (or their membership in 
“political” and “civil” societies). 
 
Similar arguments can be found in the “state-in-society” perspective (Migdal 1994 
and 2001) and the “polity approach” (Houtzager 2005), which emphasize that state 
and society are not self-contained spheres but must be understood in relational terms 
through the concrete links that exist between civil society actors, political society and 
state institutions (Mohan and Stokke 2007 forthcoming: 28). Indeed, the boundaries 
of the spheres themselves are characterized by relative fluidity (Mitlin et al 2007: 
1702). This study complemented these theoretical approaches by highlighting certain 
practical pre-conditions – in terms of various forms of capacity- that are needed for 
state-society synergies to emerge.  
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 Unfortunately there is no space here to discuss the findings from two recent experiments in the area 
of local co-governance mechanisms in Al Haouz province. 
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The agenda for future research in this area could include following Leftwich’s  (2007: 
28) suggestion and examine whether ‘the alleged tension between the informal 
institutions of patronage and patrimonialism on the one hand and Weberian 
meritocratic principles always constrain development and growth’. In other words, 
‘can the informal political institutions of patronage sometimes contribute positively? 
Might there be good (developmentally) patrons and is there any way, politically, that 
they can be used to promote pro-poor growth?’ Such research would distance itself 
from the assumption that the presence of political society is always a negative one; 
but instead conceive of local political society as a set of institutions, actors and 
cultural norms that is often constructively engaged in providing links between 
“government” and “the public”, as well as in brokering deals and forming patterns of 
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